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Abstract:  This study takes a new look at the regulatory determinants of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) by asking whether labor market flexibility affects FDI flows across 25 Western 
and Eastern European countries. The analysis is based on firm level data on new investments 
during the 1999-2001 period. We employ a variety of labor market flexibility measures that 
capture different aspects of labor laws along with a comprehensive set of controls for business 
climate characteristics.  Indices of labor market regulations reflect the flexibility of individual 
and collective dismissals, the length of the notice period, and the required severance payment. 
The results suggest that greater flexibility in the host country’s labor market relative to that in the 
investor’s home country is associated with larger FDI inflows, and this effect is found to be 
stronger in the case of transition economies. The findings indicate that as the labor market 
flexibility in the host country increases from inflexible (e.g. Slovakia) to flexible (e.g. Hungary), 
the volume of investment increases by between 14 and 18 percent. FDI in service sectors appears 
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While the existing empirical literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) has examined 
the effect of various regulatory determinants on investment flows,
1 no attention has been paid to 
one key aspect of government regulations, namely the flexibility of labor markets, despite the 
fact that both anecdotal evidence and the theoretical literature suggest that it ought be important.  
For instance, a recent issue of the Korean Times carried a headline stating that “Labor Market 
Flexibility [is] Key to Attracting Foreign Investment.”
2  Similarly, investor surveys often list 
“flexibility in hiring and laying off workers” as one of the main concerns of foreign investors 
considering entering transition economies and developing countries (Moran 1998, p. 89).  This 
view is also echoed in a theoretical paper by Haaland, Wooton and Faggio (2003) who 
demonstrate a trade-off between FDI incentives and labor market flexibility and conclude that a 
country with a more flexible labor market (i.e., lower redundancy payments) should find it easier 
to attract FDI.  To the best of our knowledge, the only empirical analysis of this question can be 
found in an unpublished paper by Dewit, Görg and Monagna (2003), which considers the impact 
of labor laws on FDI flows within the OECD countries in 1989 and 1998 and finds that an 
unfavorable employment protection differential between a domestic and a foreign location is 
inimical to FDI.
3 
This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature by asking whether the differences in labor 
market flexibility between source and host countries affect the location decisions of 
multinationals.  Unlike the work of Dewit et al.(2003), our analysis is based on firm level data. 
More precisely, we use information on new subsidiaries established by the largest 10,000 
European companies in 25 Western and Eastern European countries during 1998-2001.  The 
information comes from a commercial database, Amadeus, compiled by Bureau van Dijk.  One 
of the advantages of employing firm level data is that it allows to explicitly control for the 
characteristics of investing firms, which affect their investment decisions, such as a firm size, 
                                                 
1 Wei (2000) examined the consequences of FDI incentives and restrictions on direct investment inflows, Hines 
(1996) and Devereux and Griffith (1998) the effect of taxation, Javorcik (forthcoming) the impact of intellectual 
property protection, Keller and Levinson (2002) and Smarzynska and Wei (2001) the effect of environmental 
standards. 
2 July 19, 2002. 
3 Görg (2003) addresses a similar question using the data on the stock of US outward FDI and focusing only on the 
level of labor market flexibility in a host country rather than the differential between the home and host economies, 
as is done in Dewit et al. and this study.   3
previous FDI experience and the nature of the business (i.e., manufacturing versus services).  We 
also consider a   specification which takes into account unobserved investor characteristics. 
Western European economies and the transition economies of Eastern Europe are  
suitable for studying this question, because they offer large variation in terms of labor market 
flexibility.  In both Western and Eastern Europe we can find economies with highly inflexible 
labor markets (Portugal and the Slovak Republic) as well as countries affording employers 
relative freedom in hiring and firing decisions (Denmark and Romania).   
We employ a variety of labor market flexibility measures that capture different aspects of 
the labor laws along with a comprehensive set of controls for business climate characteristics.  
The former include indices reflecting flexibility in individual dismissals, flexibility in collective 
layoffs, length of the notice period and the required severance payment, compiled by Djankov et 
al. (2003), as well as a proxy for flexibility in hiring and firing practices from the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2001-2002 (GCR) produced jointly by the Geneva-based World 
Economic Forum and the Center for International Development at Harvard University.  
Moreover, we control for the presence of restrictions on FDI inflows, protection of property 
rights, level of corporate taxation and quality of governance.  Finally, we include proxies for 
market size and labor costs. 
The results suggest that more flexibility in the host country’s labor market relative to that 
in the investor’s country is associated with a greater probability of investment taking place as 
well as with a larger volume of investment.  The magnitude of the effect is economically 
meaningful. For instance, as the flexibility of the host country labor market increases from the 
level of France (inflexible) to the level of the United Kingdom (flexible), the volume of 
investment goes up by between 12 and 24 percent depending on the measure employed.  When 
we interact the effect of labor market regulation with a dummy for transition countries, we find 
that investors entering these economies are even more sensitive to labor market regulation.  For 
example, a change from the situation in Slovakia to that in Hungary results in a 14 to 18 percent 
increase in FDI volume.  Moreover, as expected, the magnitude of the effect is larger for firms 
operating in service sectors than in manufacturing.  
The paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, we discuss the empirical model, 
the data and the variable definitions.  Then we present the empirical results.  The last section 
contains concluding remarks.   4
Empirical Strategy  
Model and Estimation Issues 
The basic question we seek to answer is whether labor market flexibility affects the flow 
of foreign direct investment across countries. In doing so we also consider a number of other 
potential determinants of location choice, as suggested by the existing literature.
4  We employ 
two empirical strategies to address this question.  First, we focus on the location on foreign 
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where the dependent variable takes on the value of one if firm i has invested in country c, and 
zero otherwise. For each firm the number of observations is equal to the number of possible 
destination countries in the sample. To control for unobserved firm characteristics, firm specific 
dummy variables (di) are employed.  On the right hand side we include the difference in the 
labor market flexibility between the source and the host country (Flexibilityic = Flexibilityi - 
Flexibilityc ) as well as other controls for host country characteristics (Xc).  Since our prior is that 
more flexible labor regulation in the host economy relative to the source country will attract 
foreign investment, we expect β2 < 0. 
Then we focus on the size of investment and estimate the following equation 
ln (FDI volumeic + 1) = α  + Xiδ1 + Xcδ2  + δ3Flexibilityic  + εic                           (2) 
where the volume of investment undertaken by firm i in country c is regressed on characteristics 
of firm i and its home country (Xi), variables specific to potential FDI destinations (Xc) and the 
difference between the host and the source economy in terms of labor market regulations 
(Flexibilityic).  Again we expect δ3 to be negative.  The number of observations for each firm is 
equal to the number of potential investment destinations, with the FDI volume equal zero for 
countries in which firm i does not have any investments.  Since taking the logarithm would lead 
                                                 
4 For a literature review on FDI determinants see Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Markusen (1995). 
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to losing all observations for which FDI volume takes on the value of zero, we add one before 
taking the log. 
Given that most firms have subsidiaries only in some of the 25 possible destination 
countries considered and some firms have no subsidiaries at all, in a large number of cases the 
dependent variable is equal to zero. Therefore, we employ the Tobit model, as using OLS would 
lead to inconsistent estimates. 
The choice of the models is determined by data availability.  As explained below, our 
dataset contains a comprehensive listing of the existing subsidiaries of firms included in the 
sample, but the information on the volume of investment is available only for a subset of them.  
The logit model allows us to maximize the sample coverage, while the Tobit regression enables 




The data used in this study come from the commercial database Amadeus compiled by 
Bureau van Dijk, which contains comprehensive information on approximately 5 million 
companies operating in 35 European countries. In addition to the standard financial statements, 
Amadeus includes comprehensive information about the ownership structure of firms, which 
allows us to identify ownership stakes held by each company in entities located in other 
countries.  We are thus able to construct a unique data set containing detailed information about 
European firms and all of their domestic and foreign subsidiaries.  
We focus our attention on the largest 10,000 firms operating in Europe
5 (with the size 
measured by the value of total assets in 1999) and their subsidiaries located in 17 Western 
European and 8 Central and Eastern European countries, including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, Romania, Latvia and the Slovak Republic.  The last three countries 
are not included in all regressions due to missing observations on some investment climate 
variables.   
                                                 
5 The group of the largest 10,000 European firms includes 338 companies headquartered in Eastern European 
countries.  These are: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia.     6
The choice of host countries considered is driven by two considerations.  First, by the fact 
that information on the size of investment is available only for European subsidiaries, and 
second, by our decision to restrict the analysis to subsidiaries established between 1998 and 
2001. We construct the data set on new subsidiaries by comparing the subsidiary listings for 
companies included in both the 1998 and 2001 versions of the Amadeus database.
6  The 
ownership information pertains mostly to year 2000 and in some cases to 1999.  If a firm has 
more than one subsidiary in a given country, we focus our attention on the one with the highest 
value of a parent company’s equity participation.  In the sample, we also include non-investors, 
i.e., firms without any subsidiaries in foreign countries.
7 
After deleting firms with missing information and removing outliers,
8 the data set 
contains 7,150  parent firms with 7,077 subsidiaries in 22 to 25 destination countries (depending 
on the specification), including the home country, of which 3,701 are foreign subsidiaries. The 
number of potential observations in our sample is thus equal to 7,150 x 22 = 157,300 (or 7,150 x 
25 = 178,750) investment decisions at the firm level. 
 
Variables Definitions 
The dependent variable in Equation (1) is equal to one if the database indicates the 
existence of firm i’s subsidiary in country c.  In Equation (2), we construct FDI volume by 
multiplying the percentage of equity owned by firm i in its subsidiary located in country c by the 
total assets of the subsidiary.  If firm i has more than one subsidiary in country c we use the 
largest investment.  If no subsidiary exists, the variable takes on the value zero.  All information 
from the Amadeus database presented in national currencies is converted to U.S. dollars using 
the average market exchange rate for the given year from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics.  
In addition to accounting for the conditions in the host country, our data set provides us 
with an opportunity to control for the characteristics specific to parent companies (we do so only 
in Equation (2) as Equation (1) includes parent fixed effects).  We control for firm size using the 
                                                 
6 We chose not to go further back in time as the earlier versions the database were much smaller in size and 
contained very limited information on subsidiaries in Eastern Europe. 
7 Such firms drop out from the fixed effect logit estimation but are included in the tobit regressions. 
8 Firms with negative or unusually large values for sales, total assets or employment were dropped from the sample.   7
value of total assets and for the international experience by including the total number of firms’ 
foreign subsidiaries at the beginning of the period in question, 1998.
9 We anticipate that both 
variables will be positively correlated with the decision to undertake FDI.  We also take into 
account the population size and the GDP per capita of the source country expecting that more 
FDI is likely to come from richer countries and economies with higher labor costs. 
Since the purpose of our paper is to test for the effect of labor market flexibility on the 
multinational firms’ decision to invest in various countries, it is crucial to have plausible 
measures of labor market regulations. The first measure used in our analysis is the Index of 
Flexibility of Hiring and Firing Practices from the Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002 
published jointly by the Geneva-based World Economic Forum and the Center for International 
Development at Harvard University.  It is a country specific index that quantifies the average 
response to the survey question: “Is hiring and firing of workers impeded by regulations or 
flexibly determined by employers?.” It takes on the value of 7 for a very flexible labor market 
and 1 in the case of the most rigid ones.  Since it is based on the views of “business 
practitioners” in each country, it captures not only laws on the books but also their 
enforcement.
10 
We also include four additional measures, compiled by Djankov et al. (2003), reflecting 
the strength of employment protection legislation, which relates to employers’ liberty to lay off 
workers.  These are: the Index on the Flexibility of Individual Dismissal Procedures, the Index 
on the Flexibility of Collective Dismissal Procedures, the Index on Notice and Severance 
Payment and the Total Index on Rules of Dismissal.  These indices rely on information collected 
in 2001 thus matching well the time period of our sample. Their values range from 0 to 12, with 
0 representing very strict rules of dismissal and 12 the most ample ones. Thus, the higher the 
number, the less costly it is for the employer to dismiss workers.  Note that the above variables 
are country specific but, since firing costs are usually comparable across firms and industries as 
they are set by nationwide legislation, the use of country level data is appropriate.  
As illustrated in Charts 1 and 2 there is a large variation in the 25 countries considered in 
our sample in terms of labor market flexibility.  In both Western and Eastern Europe we can find 
economies with inflexible labor markets (Portugal and Slovak Republic) as well as countries 
                                                 
9 Note that the number of subsidiaries pertains investments located all over the world, not just in twenty-five 
countries considered in our sample 
10 This index has also been employed by Görg (2002).   8
affording employers relative freedom in hiring and firing decisions (Denmark and Romania).  
While there are some differences in individual rankings between the GCR and Djankov index, 
the two measures appear to be highly correlated (see Chart 3).  Recognizing that impediments to 
adjusting employment numbers constitute a push factor encouraging firms to transfer production 
out of their own country as well as a pull factor enticing firms to enter economies with flexible 
rules, we focus on the difference in labor market flexibility between the home and host country.  
Thus lower values of the variable correspond to greater flexibility being present in the host 
country and we expect to find a negative relationship between Flexibilityic and the likelihood or  
volume of investment. 
Turning to other host country specific characteristics, we control for factors commonly 
mentioned in the literature as determinants of FDI,  including proxies for market size (population 
size) and labor costs in the host country (GDP per capita in current US dollars).  Both variables 
come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  We expect that larger markets will 
attract investors while higher labor costs will act as a deterrent. 
We also control for various aspects of business climate in the host country.  The first 
control is the FDI Restrictions Index derived by Wei (2000) based on reading the detailed 
country reports produced by PricewaterhouseCoopers. The index focuses on four areas: the 
existence of foreign exchange controls (which may interfere with foreign firms’ ability to import 
intermediate inputs or repatriate profits abroad), exclusion of foreign firms from strategic sectors 
(e.g., defense industry, media), exclusion of foreign firms from other sectors, and restrictions on 
the share of foreign ownership.  Each of these four dimensions is represented by a variable 
taking on the value of one in the presence of restrictions and zero otherwise.  The overall index is 
defined as the sum of these variables and ranges from zero (no restrictions) to four (restrictions 
present in all areas). 
 The second control is the Index of Strength of Property Rights, which comes from the 
Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002. It is based on an extensive survey of managers who 
were asked to rate on the scale 1 to 7 whether the “property rights [in a given country] are clearly 
delineated and protected by law.” Subsequently, the arithmetic mean of all responses by country 
was reported. A score of 7 corresponds to countries with well protected property rights and 1 to 
the countries with little or no protection.  This variable is intended to capture the country specific   9
risk that multinational firms may face from possible expropriation of assets, insecurity of 
property rights and contracts.  
Another potentially important factor influencing the FDI location is the level of corporate 
taxation in the host country, as demonstrated by Hines (1996) and Devereux and Griffith (1998).   
We employ the corporate tax rates as reported by PricewaterhouseCoopers. All taxes are 
expressed in percentages; if several rates apply, the highest one is used. 
Finally, we also control for the quality of governance using the measure derived by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (KKZ) and described in detail in their 1999 publication.  
When constructing their measure based on data from 17 different sources, the authors assume 
that the available individual country ratings reflect both some true but unobserved level of 
governance and sampling variations and perception errors.  The unobserved “true” level of 
governance can be backed out statistically (assuming a linear unobserved component 
specification).  The resulting estimates range from –2.5 to 2.5, with a mean of zero and standard 
deviation of one.  The higher the estimate for each country, the less corrupt and better governed 
the country. The KKZ index can be viewed as a more sophisticated and improved version of the 
popular Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.  
As can be seen in Table 1, a large degree of heterogeneity is found in terms of business 
environment in host countries in our sample. Transition economies usually rank low with respect 
to governance measures and property rights protection. However, the picture is mixed with 
regard to FDI incentives and labor market flexibility and corporate taxation, as in both Western 
and Eastern Europe we find countries with very different scores in those areas.  For instance, 
while some transition economies, especially Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland, have no or 
very few restrictions, others, such as Ukraine, have restrictions in all categories.  Similarly, while 
the Slovak Republic has the highest corporate tax rate, Hungary offers the lowest one in the 
sample.   
   10
Estimation Results 
FDI Determinants 
We begin by examining the determinants of FDI, other than labor market flexibility.  We 
estimate a logit model with fixed effects for each investing company.
11  The results are presented 
in the first column of Table 2. We find positive and significant coefficients on the host country’s 
population size and GDP per capita, suggesting that larger and richer countries are more 
attractive investment destinations.  Further, the data suggest that lower restrictions on FDI and 
better governance are associated with a higher probability of FDI taking place.  As anticipated, 
the index of property rights protection bears a positive sign but does not appear to be statistically 
significant.  The coefficient on the corporate tax rate is positive and significant, which is 
somewhat counterintuitive, yet not unusual in the literature on determinants of FDI.  Finally, a 
dummy for transition countries is positive and significant indicating that these countries have a 
higher probability of receiving FDI than what would be predicted given their economic and 
regulatory environment. 
 
Effect of Labor Market Flexibility 
Next, we turn our attention to labor markets and proceed by including one by one five 
measures capturing differences in labor market flexibility between the investor’s home country 
and the host economy.  Since higher values of these variables correspond to the labor market 
being more flexible at home relative to the host country, we expect the estimated coefficient to 
be negative if greater flexibility in the host economy is attractive to investors.  The first measure 
included is the GCR Index of Flexibility of Hiring and Firing practices (Table 2).  Its coefficient 
is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, thus suggesting that indeed, other 
things being equal, the more flexible the host country’s labor market is relative to that in the 
source country, the higher the probability of FDI taking place.  The same conclusion is reached 
when the Total Index on Rules for Dismissal, compiled by Djankov and al. (2003), as well as 
each of its components, i.e., Index of Flexibility of Individual Dismissal Procedures, Index of 
Flexibility of Collective Dismissal Procedures and Index of Notice and Severance Payment are 
                                                 
11 Note that in the fixed effect logit firms without any investment projects drop out of the estimation.   11
used.  In all four cases the indices have negative and highly significant coefficients.  Including 
the labor market variables has little impact on the signs or significance levels of other 
determinants of FDI, with the exception of  the property rights protection index, which becomes 
positive and statistically significant in most regressions, confirming the belief that a stable and 
well-enforced property rights system is crucial to attracting foreign investors. 
The regressions presented so far constrain the effects of labor market flexibility on FDI to 
be equal across countries. This may be a strong assumption since the sample of host countries in 
our data set includes industrial as well as transition economies.  To relax this assumption we 
introduce an interaction between the labor market flexibility measures and a dummy variable for 
transition countries and repeat the exercise.  We find that both the labor market variables and the 
interaction terms are negative and highly statistically significant, which suggests that as far as 
transition economies are concerned, the flexibility of the labor markets is an even more 
important factor in the decision of the multinational to locate there.  
Next, we focus our attention on explaining the determinants of FDI volume rather than 
the mere fact of investment taking place. We employ the Tobit estimation technique and follow 
the same procedure of consecutively adding the labor market variables to the regression, keeping 
the same controls as before.  In addition, we include some source country characteristics, such as 
the logarithm of the GDP per capita and the population size.
12  We also account for the 
characteristics of the investing firms, in particular their size and their international experience.  
The former is captured by the logarithm of firm’s total assets and the latter by the logarithm of 
the total number of firms’ foreign subsidiaries in 1998.  
The results, presented in Table 3, confirm our previous findings of the difference in the 
labor market flexibility between the source and the host country being an important factor 
affecting the location decision of multinational firms.  All five indices of the relative labor 
market flexibility have the expected negative signs and are statistically significant at the one 
percent level.  This result is robust to including the interactions with a transition country dummy.  
As for the interaction terms themselves, only in two out of five regressions they suggest that the 
effect of labor market regulation on investment volume is larger for transition countries than for 
the full sample.   
                                                 
12 Note that the number of observations is smaller in Tobit than in fixed effects logit regressions due to missing 
observations on investment volume.   12
The other controls for host country characteristics have the same signs as in the previous 
table and are highly significant.  The only exception is the host country GDP per capita, which 
now bears a negative and statistically significant sign.  The negative association between this 
variable and the investment volume is consistent with the view that GDP per capita can be 
interpreted as an (albeit imperfect) proxy for the level of labor costs. As for the investor 
characteristics, we find that larger firms as well as firms with greater international experience are 
more likely to undertake FDI.  The same is true of firms headquartered in richer and larger 
countries.  The latter effect is statistically significant only in four regressions. 
The magnitude of the effects is economically meaningful.  As the flexibility of the host 
country labor market increases from the level of France (inflexible) to the level of the United 
Kingdom (flexible) the volume of investment goes up by between 12 and 24 percent depending 
on the labor regulation proxy employed.  The effect is equally large for transition countries—a 
change from the situation in Slovakia to that in Hungary results in a 14 to 18 percent increase in 
FDI volume.   
 
Robustness Checks 
As a robustness check and an attempt to increase the number of transition economies 
included in the regression we drop the measure of FDI restrictions and the corporate tax rates 
from the regressions. This allows us to include in the regressions three additional transition 
economies: Romania, Latvia and the Slovak Republic. Again we estimate the fixed effect logit 
and the Tobit model and follow the same approach of consecutively adding the labor market 
flexibility variables. The results, presented in Tables 4 and 5, indicate that our previous findings 
are robust to increase the number of countries in the dataset.  As before, the labor market 
flexibility proxies are all negative and statistically significant, reinforcing our previous findings.  
The only difference comes from the interactions between the labor market variables and the 
transition country dummy in the Tobit model.  The relationship between the value of investment 
and labor market flexibility appears to be weaker for transition countries than for the sample as a 
whole and in two cases it even breaks down for transition countries.  In all regressions, however, 
the link between labor market flexibility and the value of FDI in Western European economies  
remains robust.   13
As yet another robustness check (not presented here to conserve space), we applied the 
same approach to all existing rather than only new subsidiaries of the top 10,000 European 
companies. In the case of multiple subsidiaries being held by the same parent company in a 
given host country, we included only the largest investment in the sample, regardless of when the 
subsidiary was created.  The rationale for this exercise was that multinational companies tend to 
respond quickly to change in business environment by relocating their activities to other places.  
As expected, we obtained results consistent with our previous findings. Labor market flexibility 
variables were again consistently negative and statistically significant, reinforcing our earlier 
results that labor market conditions are a key determinant of both the location and the volume of 
FDI. 
 
Manufacturing versus Service Sectors 
If labor market flexibility indeed matters for the location choice of multinational 
companies, then we would expect it to be of greater importance to multinationals in more labor-
intensive sectors. Since services are usually more labor intensive than manufacturing, and since 
our rich database includes information about the industry in which the investing company 
operates, we examine whether the two types of sectors respond differently to labor market 
regulations.  To do so, we introduce an interaction between a dummy variable equal to one for 
service sectors and the proxies for labor market flexibility and follow the same empirical strategy 
as before. The results, presented in Tables 6 and 7, confirm our priors. We find that the 
interaction terms are statistically significant and negative in all cases. That is, labor market 




Labor market rigidities are often cited as one of the factors that multinationals take into 
account when deciding on a prospective host country for invetsment, yet hardly any attention has 
been paid to this issue in the empirical literature. This paper is an attempt to further our 
knowledge in this area. Using firm level data on new foreign investments undertaken by   14
European companies during the period 1999-2001 and a comprehensive set of  labor market 
indicators, we examine the impact of labor market flexibility on FDI inflows into 25 European 
countries.  
Our empirical findings are as follows. The FDI location choices as well as the volume of 
FDI are negatively related to labor market flexibility. That is, the more flexible the labor market 
in the host economy relative to the investor’s home country, the higher the likelihood of 
investment in the host country. As expected, this effect matters more for firms operating in 
service sectors than for manufacturing companies. 
   15
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Variable Definition  Source 
FDI dummy  A new subsidiary was created during 
1998-2001 (see the text for details)  Amadeus database 
FDI volume 
The value of firm’s investment into 
its new foreign subsidiary (see the 
text for details) 
Own calculations based on the 
Amadeus database 
Firm’s size  Value of total assets in US dollars  Amadeus database 
Firm’s international 
experience 
Number of foreign subsidiaries in 
1998  Amadeus database 
GDP per capita  Current US dollars  World Bank World Development 
Indicators Database 
Population size    World Bank World Development 
Indicators Database 
FDI Restrictions 
Controls for the business climate in 
the host country. The Index ranges 
from  0 for no restrictions to 4 for  
restrictions present in all areas. 
Wei (2000) 
Property rights 
The index ranges from 1 for little or 
no protection, to 7 for strongest 
protection of property rights. 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2001-2002 
Corporate tax rate  Expressed in percentages  PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Governance  The index ranges from –2.5 for very 
corrupt to 2.5 for  best governed. 
Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton (1999) 
The Index of Flexibility of 
Hiring and Firing Practices 
Ranges from 0 for a very rigid to 7 for 
a very flexible labor market 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2001-2002 
Total Index on rules of 
Dismissal 
Ranges from 0 for very strict to 12 for 
very flexible rules  Djankov et al. (2003) 
Index on the Flexibility of 
Individual Dismissal 
Procedures 
Ranges from 0 for very strict to 12 for 
very flexible rules  Djankov et al. (2003) 
Index of Flexibility of 
Collective Dismissal 
Procedures 
Ranges from 0 for very strict to 12 for 
very flexible rules  Djankov et al. (2003) 
Index on Notice and 
Severance Payment 
Ranges from 0 for very strict to 12 for 
very flexible rules  Djankov et al. (2003)   19
Table 1. Host Country Characteristics                 




















payment  Overall index
AT  10.2  15.9  2  6.4  34  2.02  2.8  1 3 1 8 
BE  10.1  16.1  0  5.9  40  1.23  2.9  2 4 2  11 
BG  7.4  15.9  2  3.2  36  -0.5  3.6  2 4 2 9 
CH  10.5  15.8  1  4.1  23  2.58  4.1  2 4 1  10 
CZ  8.6  16.1  1  4.4  35  0.35  4.2  1 3 0 5 
DK  10.4  15.5  2  6.4  34  2.57  4.9  2 3 2  10 
ES  9.6  17.5  2  5.9  35  1.58  3.2  1 1 1 4 
FI  10.1  15.5  2  6.5  28  2.55  2.9  2 2 1 7 
FR  10.1  17.9  2  6.4  33.3  1.75  2  1 1 1 5 
GB  10.1  17.9  0  6.3  30  2.32  3.9  2 4 2  10 
GR  9.3  16.2  3 5  40  0.85  2.4  2 3 1 6 
HU  8.5  16.1  0  5.3  18  0.69  4.3  2 3 1 8 
IE  10.1  15.1  1  6.1  32  2.15  3.3  2 3 2  10 
IT  9.9  17.9  2  6.2  37  1  2.3  2 2 1 8 
LV  7.9  14.7  .  4.3  .  -0.1  3.4  0 1 2 4 
NL  10.1  16.6  0  6.5  35  2.48  2.5  0 2 2 6 
NO  10.4  15.3  2  5.9  28  2.34  2.2  1 1 2 6 
PL  8.3  17.5  1  4.6  32  0.49  2.6  1 2 1 6 
PT  9.3  16.1  1  5.3  36  1.55  2.7  2 1 0 3 
RO  7.4  16.9  .  4.5  .  -0.38  6.3  2 4 2 9 
SE  10.2  16.0  0  5.9  28  2.54  2.3  1 1 1 5 
RU  7.19  18.8  4  2.4  35  -0.69  4.7  0 1 0 2 
SK  8.2  15.5  .  5.2  40  -0.08  2.8  1 2 0 4 
TR  8.0  18.0  2  4.2  33  -0.01  4.2  2 3 0 8 
UA  6.4  17.7  4  3.2  30  -0.89  4.8  1 0 1 3 
Total  9.2  15.9 1.3 5.4  32.6  1.2  3.3  1.4 2.4 1.2 6.8   20
 
Table 2. Determinants of the Decision to Invest - Fixed Effect Logit Regression       
Host country GDP per capita  1.296*** 1.421*** 1.071*** 1.213*** 1.104*** 1.082*** 1.419***  1.063***  1.208***  1.076***  1.087*** 
  [0.063] [0.064] [0.066] [0.063] [0.064] [0.064] [0.064]  [0.066]  [0.063]  [0.064]  [0.064] 
Host country population  1.326*** 1.293*** 1.315*** 1.304*** 1.289*** 1.332*** 1.299***  1.338***  1.301***  1.311***  1.379*** 
  [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]  [0.020]  [0.020]  [0.020]  [0.021] 
FDI restrictions  -0.543*** -0.506*** -0.444*** -0.433*** -0.387*** -0.464*** -0.512***  -0.427***  -0.433***  -0.373***  -0.434*** 
  [0.018] [0.018] [0.021] [0.020] [0.022] [0.019] [0.018]  [0.021]  [0.020]  [0.022]  [0.020] 
Property rights  0.038 0.140***  0.070**  -0.02 0.149*** 0.037 0.131***  0.018  -0.015  0.111*** -0.061* 
  [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031]  [0.033]  [0.032]  [0.032]  [0.034] 
Corporate tax rate  0.016*** 0.023*** 0.027***  0.001  0.021*** 0.054*** 0.025***  0.035***  -0.001  0.027***  0.072*** 
  [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.006] 
Governance  0.478*** 0.343*** 0.657*** 0.331*** 0.590*** 0.897*** 0.373***  0.732***  0.323***  0.658***  1.042*** 
  [0.052] [0.053] [0.055] [0.053] [0.053] [0.060] [0.053]  [0.058]  [0.054]  [0.054]  [0.063] 
Transition country dummy (TE)  1.187*** 1.236*** 1.268*** 0.931*** 1.243*** 1.719*** 1.171***  1.478***  0.869***  1.291***  1.981*** 
  [0.109] [0.108] [0.107] [0.113] [0.107] [0.116] [0.111]  [0.115]  [0.139]  [0.107]  [0.121] 
Difference in Hiring/Firing Rules    -0.243***          -0.222***      
    [0.021]          [0.021]      
Difference in Hiring/Firing Rules * TE              -0.163***      
              [0.042]      
Difference in Dismissal Rules      -0.071***         -0.070***       
     [0.008]         [0.008]       
Difference in Dismissal Rules Index *TE           -0.089***       
           [0.018]       
Difference in Severance Rules        -0.449***        -0.456***     
       [0.038]        [0.039]     
Difference in Severance Rules * TE             0.057     
             [0.075]     
Difference in Collective Dismissal Rules         -0.194***         -0.187***   
         [0.016]         [0.016]   
Difference in Collective Dismissal Rules * TE                  -0.221***   
               [0.034]   
Difference in Individual Dismissal Rules         -0.366***          -0.360*** 
         [0.027]          [0.027] 
Difference in Individual Dismissal Rules * TE                    -0.488*** 
                 [0.067] 
R-sq  0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36  0.36  0.36  0.36  0.36 
Chi-sq  11,674 11,802 11,737 11,798 11,810 11,838 11,817  11,760  11,798  11,854  11,890 
Prob>Chi-sq  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
No. of obs.  77,792 77,748 77,682 77,682 77,682 77,682 77,748  77,682  77,682  77,682  77,682 
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Table 3. Determinants of the Investment Volume - Tobit Regression  
Investing firm's size  0.065***  0.071*** 0.074***  0.078*** 0.077***  0.070***  0.071*** 0.074***  0.078***  0.077*** 0.070*** 
  [0.005]  [0.005] [0.005]  [0.005] [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] [0.005] 
International experience  0.090***  0.081*** 0.076***  0.071*** 0.072***  0.078***  0.081*** 0.076***  0.071***  0.072*** 0.078*** 
  [0.005]  [0.005] [0.005]  [0.005] [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] [0.005] 
Source country GDP per capita  0.111***  0.119*** 0.196***  0.315*** 0.109***  0.122***  0.119*** 0.196***  0.317***  0.109*** 0.122*** 
  [0.030]  [0.030] [0.030]  [0.030] [0.030]  [0.030]  [0.030] [0.030]  [0.030]  [0.030] [0.030] 
Source country population  -0.015**  -0.005 0.003  -0.007  0.017**  0.023***  -0.004 0.003  -0.007  0.017**  0.023*** 
  [0.007]  [0.007] [0.007]  [0.007] [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007] [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007] [0.007] 
Host country GDP per capita  -0.288***  -0.255*** -0.376***  -0.274*** -0.382***  -0.339***  -0.258*** -0.376***  -0.290***  -0.378*** -0.328*** 
  [0.018]  [0.018] [0.018]  [0.018] [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.018] [0.018]  [0.019]  [0.018] [0.018] 
Host country population  0.432***  0.432*** 0.467***  0.472*** 0.466***  0.505***  0.432*** 0.467***  0.466***  0.462*** 0.516*** 
  [0.006]  [0.006] [0.006]  [0.006] [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.006] [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.006] [0.007] 
FDI restrictions  -0.201***  -0.204*** -0.168***  -0.196*** -0.153***  -0.175***  -0.208*** -0.169***  -0.199***  -0.157*** -0.167*** 
  [0.006]  [0.006] [0.006]  [0.006] [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006] [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006] [0.006] 
Property rights  0.026***  0.044***  0.030***  -0.020**  0.067*** 0.01 0.042***  0.031***  -0.017*  0.069***  -0.005 
  [0.009]  [0.009] [0.009]  [0.009] [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009] [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009] [0.009] 
Corporate tax rate  0.016***  0.018*** 0.021***  0.010*** 0.015***  0.027***  0.018*** 0.020***  0.010***  0.016*** 0.028*** 
  [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001] 
Governance  0.617***  0.589*** 0.732***  0.566*** 0.718***  0.817***  0.596*** 0.731***  0.560***  0.712*** 0.830*** 
  [0.019]  [0.019] [0.019]  [0.018] [0.019]  [0.020]  [0.019] [0.019]  [0.018]  [0.019] [0.020] 
Transition country dummy (TE)  0.184***  0.178*** 0.266***  0.088*** 0.221***  0.471***  0.166*** 0.263***  0.009  0.211*** 0.510*** 
  [0.025]  [0.025] [0.025]  [0.025] [0.025]  [0.027]  [0.025] [0.027]  [0.034]  [0.025] [0.028] 
Difference in Hiring/Firing Rules    -0.066***          -0.058***        
   [0.005]         [0.005]        
Difference in Hiring/Firing Rules * TE            -0.032***        
            [0.010]        
Difference in Dismissal Rules       -0.042***          -0.043***      
     [0.002]        [0.002]      
Difference in Dismissal Rules Index *TE            0.001      
              [ 0 . 0 0 4 ]       
Difference in Severance Rules        -0.241***        -0.258***    
       [0.007]        [0.009]    
Difference in Severance Rules * TE               0.055***    
               [0.016]    
Difference in Collective Dismissal Rules      -0.090***        -0.095***   
        [0.003]        [0.004]   
Difference in Collective Dismissal Rules * TE              0.020***   
                [0.007]   
Difference in Individual Dismissal Rules        -0.205***        -0.188*** 
          [0.007]        [0.008] 
Difference in Individual Dismissal Rules * TE                -0.077*** 
                  [0.015] 
R-sq  0.04  0.04 0.04  0.05 0.04  0.04  0.04 0.04  0.05  0.04 0.04 
Chi-sq  7,857  8,050 8,445  9,018 8,598  8,672  8,059 8,445  9,030  8,607 8,696 
Prob>Chi-sq  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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Table 4. Determinants of the Decision to Invest - Fixed Effect Logit Regression - Three Additional Countries     
Host country GDP per capita  0.920***  1.517*** 1.478*** 0.668*** 0.674*** 1.024*** 1.026*** 0.845***  0.851***  0.876***  0.882*** 
  [0.057]  [0.062] [0.062] [0.058] [0.058] [0.060] [0.061] [0.059]  [0.059]  [0.058]  [0.058] 
Host country population  1.045***  1.140*** 1.150*** 1.095*** 1.097*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 1.038***  1.043***  1.111***  1.113*** 
  [0.015]  [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.016] 
Property rights  0.131***  0.309*** 0.326*** 0.220*** 0.212***  0.023  0.023  0.320***  0.307***  0.200***  0.190*** 
  [0.025]  [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] [0.025]  [0.026]  [0.025]  [0.026] 
Governance  0.738***  0.300*** 0.279*** 0.751*** 0.750*** 0.506*** 0.506*** 0.559***  0.564***  0.878***  0.875*** 
  [0.039]  [0.042] [0.042] [0.038] [0.038] [0.041] [0.041] [0.039]  [0.039]  [0.039]  [0.039] 
Transition country dummy (TE)  1.240***  1.440*** 1.505*** 1.232*** 1.257*** 1.108*** 1.117*** 1.105***  1.104***  1.732***  1.734*** 
  [0.086]  [0.090] [0.088] [0.090] [0.092] [0.097] [0.112] [0.089]  [0.089]  [0.091]  [0.091] 
                 
Difference in Hiring/Firing Rules    -0.501*** -0.545***               
    [0.017] [0.018]               
Difference in Hiring/Firing Rules * TE     0.203***              
     [0.031]              
Difference in Dismissal Rules        -0.210***  -0.207***           
       [0.007]  [0.007]           
Difference in Dismissal Rules Index *TE        -0.018           
        [ 0 . 0 1 4 ]            
Difference in Severance Rules          -0.411*** -0.409***        
         [0.029] [0.031]        
Difference in Severance Rules * TE          -0.009         
          [ 0 . 0 5 6 ]          
Difference in Collective Dismissal Rules           -0.456*** -0.448***     
           [0.013] [0.013]     
Difference in Collective Dismissal Rules * TE         -0.071***     
           [0.028]     
Difference in Individual Dismissal Rules             -0.641***  -0.632*** 
             [0.025]  [0.026] 
Difference in Individual Dismissal Rules * TE              -0.067 
                [ 0 . 0 5 3 ]  
                 
R-sq  0.32  0.34 0.34  0.3  0.31 0.29 0.29 0.32  0.32  0.3  0.3 
Chi-sq  12,699  13,545 13,588 11,259 11,571 10,735 10,735 11,786  11,792  11,257  11,259 
Prob>Chi-sq  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
No. of obs.  106,440  106,380  106,380  92,118 92,118 92,118 92,118 92,118  92,118  92,118  92,118 
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Table 5. Determinants of the Investment Volume - Tobit Regression – Three Additional Countries
Investing firm's size  0.050*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.059*** 0.060***
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] 
International experience  0.072*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.068***  0.077***  0.076*** 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] 
Source country GDP  per capita  0.093*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.162*** 0.164*** 0.222*** 0.227*** 0.102*** 0.102***  0.108***  0.110*** 
  [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026]  [0.026]  [0.026] 
Source country population  -0.019*** -0.013**  -0.012**  -0.004  -0.003  -0.012*  -0.011*  0.007  0.008  -0.001  0.002 
  [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006] 
Host country GDP  per capita  -0.111*** -0.064*** -0.094*** -0.125*** -0.161*** -0.061*** -0.084*** -0.152*** -0.157***  -0.085***  -0.132*** 
  [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.016] 
Host country population  0.189*** 0.193*** 0.214*** 0.257*** 0.253*** 0.261*** 0.255*** 0.256*** 0.254***  0.258***  0.263*** 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] 
Property rights  0.123*** 0.126*** 0.146*** 0.110*** 0.130*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.124*** 0.144***  0.106***  0.140*** 
  [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008] 
Governance  0.342*** 0.312*** 0.316*** 0.369*** 0.387*** 0.309*** 0.311*** 0.390*** 0.392***  0.367***  0.409*** 
  [0.012] [0.013] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.014] 
Transition country dummy (TE)  0.348*** 0.366*** 0.381*** 0.358*** 0.267*** 0.314*** 0.243*** 0.324*** 0.290***  0.420***  0.399*** 
  [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.020] [0.021] [0.020] [0.026] [0.020] [0.020]  [0.021]  [0.021] 
Difference in Hiring/Firing Rules    -0.037*** -0.104***            
    [0.003] [0.004]            
Difference in Hiring/Firing Rules * TE    0.146***            
     [0.007]            
Difference in Dismissal Rules       -0.029*** -0.044***             
      [0.001] [0.002]             
Difference in Dismissal Rules Index *TE     0.039***            
      [0.003]            
Difference in Severance Rules         -0.140***  -0.163***        
        [0.006]  [0.008]        
Difference in Severance Rules * TE         0.052***        
         [0.012]        
Difference in Collective Dismissal Rules         -0.066***  -0.101***     
          [0.003]  [0.003]     
Difference in Collective Dismissal Rules * TE          0.090***     
           [0.005]     
Difference in Individual Dismissal Rules           -0.082***  -0.162*** 
            [0.006]  [0.007] 
Difference in Individual Dismissal Rules * TE             0.187*** 
              [0.011] 
               
R-sq  0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03  0.03  0.03 
Chi-sq  6,004 6,130 6,624 5,797 5,975 5,975 5,993 5,980 6,263  5,591  5,855 
Prob>Chi-sq  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
No. of obs.  78,572 78,542 78,542 67,683 67,683 67,683 67,683 67,683 67,683  67,683  67,683   24
Table 6. Determinants of the Decision to Invest - Fixed Effect Logit Regression - Services vs. Manufacturing 
Host country GDP per capita  1.424*** 1.083*** 1.114*** 1.233*** 1.080*** 
  [0.064] [0.064] [0.064] [0.063] [0.067] 
Host country population  1.292*** 1.330*** 1.285*** 1.302*** 1.312*** 
  [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] 
FDI restrictions  -0.505*** -0.464*** -0.386*** -0.428*** -0.444*** 
  [0.018] [0.019] [0.022] [0.020] [0.021] 
Property rights  0.139*** 0.037 0.149*** -0.018 0.072** 
  [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] 
Corporate tax rate  0.023***  0.054***  0.021*** 0 0.026*** 
  [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Governance  0.335*** 0.891*** 0.579*** 0.316*** 0.647*** 
  [0.053] [0.060] [0.053] [0.053] [0.055] 
Transition country dummy (TE)  1.235*** 1.709*** 1.246*** 0.942*** 1.267*** 
  [0.108] [0.116] [0.107] [0.113] [0.108] 
Difference  in  Hiring/Firing  Rules  -0.071*      
  [0.037]      
Difference in Hiring/Firing Rules * Services  -0.232***         
  [0.040]      
Difference in Dismissal Rules     -0.245***       
    [0.047]     
Difference in Dismissal Rules Index * Services    -0.164***       
    [0.051]     
Difference in Severance Rules       -0.081***     
     [0.026]     
Difference in Severance Rules * Services      -0.152***     
     [0.028]     
Difference in Collective Dismissal Rules        -0.213***   
       [0.056]   
Difference in Collective Dismissal Rules * Services        -0.331***   
       [0.058]   
Difference in Individual Dismissal Rules          -0.019 
       [0.013] 
Difference in Individual Dismissal Rules * Services          -0.070*** 
       [0.014] 
       
R-sq  0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Chi Sq  11,831 11,844 11,834 11,826 11,757 
Prob>Chi sq  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
No. of obs.  77,682 77,616 77,616 77,616 77,616 
Standard errors in brackets; *** significant at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10%       
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Table 7. Determinants of the Investment Volume –Tobit Regression – Services vs. Manufacturing 
Investing firm's size  0.071*** 0.071*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.074*** 
  [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
International experience  0.080*** 0.077*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.075*** 
  [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Source country GDP per capita  0.120*** 0.124*** 0.312*** 0.107*** 0.194*** 
  [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] 
Source country population  -0.004 0.024*** -0.006 0.018*** 0.005 
  [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
Host country GDP per capita  -0.254*** -0.339*** -0.273*** -0.382*** -0.375*** 
  [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] 
Host country population  0.432*** 0.506*** 0.472*** 0.466*** 0.468*** 
  [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
FDI restrictions  -0.204*** -0.174*** -0.196*** -0.153*** -0.168*** 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Property rights  0.045*** 0.01 -0.020**  0.067***  0.030*** 
  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
Corporate tax rate  0.018*** 0.027*** 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Governance  0.589*** 0.818*** 0.565*** 0.718*** 0.732*** 
  [0.019] [0.020] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] 
Transition country dummy (TE)  0.178*** 0.473*** 0.088*** 0.221*** 0.267*** 
  [0.025] [0.027] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] 
Difference in Hiring/Firing Rules  -0.038***         
  [0.009]      
Difference in Hiring/Firing Rules * Services  -0.037***         
  [0.010]      
Difference in Dismissal Rules     -0.170***       
   [0.013]       
Difference in Dismissal Rules Index *Services    -0.047***       
   [0.014]       
Difference in Severance Rules       -0.208***     
     [0.013]    
Difference in Severance Rules * Services      -0.044***     
     [0.014]    
Difference in Collective Dismissal Rules        -0.068***   
       [0.006]  
Difference in Collective Dismissal Rules * Services        -0.029***   
       [0.007]  
Difference in Individual Dismissal Rules          -0.031*** 
       [0.003] 
Difference in Individual Dismissal Rules * Services          -0.014*** 
       [0.003] 
Services Dummy  -0.018 0.00 0.015  0.011 0.01 
  [0.013] [0.012] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] 
R-sq  0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Chi-sq  8,063 8,683 9,028 8,615 8,461 
Prob>Chi-sq  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
No. of obs.  57,335 57,293 57,293 57,293 57,293 
Standard errors in brackets; *** significant at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10% 
 